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PPS pcn, whilst delivering parcels for amazon.
#11
@zyno, not unexpected and so we move on to the POPLA appeal. Have you managed to get any more evidence of the driver operating as a courier making Amazon deliveries at the time? If so, make sure you add that evidence to the POPLA appeal and adjust the wording in this appeal accordingly.

You have 33 days from the date of the initial appeal rejection to submit the POPLA appeal. So, first I need you to go through this draft POPLA appeal and let me know if there are any things that need adjusting. Once we've established that the appeal is good to go, you can submit it as a PDF attachment. In the appeal box, just say "see attached PDF appeal".

Quote:POPLA APPEAL

Operator: Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd (PPS)
Location: Donnington House, 2A Sutton Court Road, Sutton, SM1 4SY
Date of alleged contravention: 1 October 2026
Allegation: Failure to display a valid permit

Preliminary submission

This appeal is submitted solely in the capacity of registered keeper. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and no admission is made concerning that identity. PPS expressly acknowledged this position in its rejection of the initial appeal.

The alleged contravention arose while the vehicle was being used in connection with Amazon courier deliveries. The appellant's position is that the vehicle was temporarily stopped in connection with delivery activity rather than being parked for an ordinary residential or recreational purpose. The available Amazon records confirm a scheduled delivery block between 19:45 and 22:15 on 1 October 2026, encompassing the alleged contravention at approximately 20:29. Although those records do not independently identify the precise delivery address, they provide contemporaneous supporting evidence of the vehicle's courier activity.

The appellant disputes PPS's entitlement to recover the charge on six grounds: failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA); failure to establish the appellant's liability as keeper; failure to demonstrate contractual authority and compliance with the landowner's requirements concerning couriers; uncertainty concerning the person responsible for recording the alleged contravention and the method of enforcement; failure to establish an enforceable contract; and inadequate consideration of the nature and duration of the vehicle's stationary presence.

The appellant additionally invites POPLA to have regard to the principles reflected in the Government's Private Parking Code of Practice, published on 20 October 2026 pursuant to the Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019. It is acknowledged that this Code was not operative on the date of the alleged contravention and cannot impose retrospective obligations. Nevertheless, its provisions are relevant as persuasive regulatory context where they reinforce existing legislation, contractual principles or obligations already contained in the applicable Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP).

1. Failure to comply with PoFA Schedule 4: no statutory keeper liability

PPS seeks to recover a parking charge from the registered keeper without having established the identity of the driver. Its entitlement to do so under Schedule 4 is conditional upon compliance with the applicable statutory requirements. It is submitted that its Notice to Keeper (NtK) fails to satisfy paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e).

1.1 Failure to specify the period of parking — paragraph 9(2)(a)

Paragraph 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to specify the period of parking to which the notice relates. PPS instead states:

"The period of parking to which this notice relates is the period that immediately preceded the Incident Date and Time."

That formulation identifies neither a commencement time nor a duration. The expression "immediately preceded" is inherently indeterminate and does not permit the recipient to establish the temporal limits of the alleged parking period. Parliament required specification of a period of parking, not merely an incident timestamp accompanied by an undefined reference to an earlier interval.

In rejecting the initial appeal, PPS disclosed that its operative allegedly observed the vehicle between 20:21:53 and 20:29:22, an interval of seven minutes and twenty-nine seconds. PPS therefore appears to have possessed precise observation records but chose not to specify that interval within the NtK. Its subsequent reliance upon those records cannot retrospectively amend the contents of the notice originally served.

There is an essential distinction between evidence that a vehicle was stationary during an observation period and compliance with a statutory requirement to specify the period of parking in the NtK. The latter is a condition of exercising the statutory right to recover the charge from the keeper. The former cannot simply be substituted for it.

1.2 Failure to comply with paragraph 9(2)(e)

Paragraph 9(2)(e) requires the creditor to state that it does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver, and to invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges or, if the keeper was not driving, to provide the prescribed driver particulars and pass the notice to the driver.

These are cumulative statutory requirements. The obligation to make the specified statement concerning the creditor's knowledge is not displaced by providing payment instructions or inviting the keeper to identify the driver.

The NtK does not expressly state that PPS does not know both the driver's name and current address for service. Instead, PPS relies upon a conditional warning concerning the consequences of those particulars remaining unknown after the statutory 28-day period. Such wording addresses the separate requirement under paragraph 9(2)(f) and does not necessarily satisfy paragraph 9(2)(e).

PPS's rejection is particularly revealing. It claims compliance because the NtK identifies the creditor, provides payment instructions and invites the keeper to provide the driver's particulars. Identifying the creditor addresses paragraph 9(2)(h), while the remaining matters do not establish compliance with the opening requirement of paragraph 9(2)(e). PPS has conspicuously failed to identify where the requisite statement appears within its notice.

There is a further concern regarding the statement:

"We, the Creditor, now require this amount to be paid using one of the payment methods described overleaf."

This is expressed as an unconditional demand rather than the statutory invitation contemplated by paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). While the appellant acknowledges that PoFA does not necessarily require verbatim reproduction of its wording, an operator must communicate the substance of the statutory requirements accurately, particularly where the recipient's personal liability has not been established.

The contrast is illustrated by Annex C of the Government's forthcoming statutory Code, whose example notice wording distinguishes the driver's underlying obligation from the options available to the keeper. Although illustrative rather than mandatory, that distinction reinforces the importance of not presenting an unestablished keeper liability as an existing debt.

1.3 Mandatory statutory conditions cannot be disregarded as minor technicalities

Parliament enacted Schedule 4 to establish a conditional statutory mechanism for recovering certain unpaid parking charges from keepers who have not been established to be the liable drivers. The conditions prescribed by Parliament govern the existence of that entitlement; they are not discretionary drafting guidelines.

Consequently, a failure to satisfy an applicable mandatory condition cannot be disregarded merely because an assessor regards the omission as minor, considers that the keeper understood the allegation, or is satisfied that the operator has otherwise demonstrated a parking contravention. Partial or substantial compliance is not a substitute for satisfying the statutory conditions as properly interpreted.

This is expressly reinforced by the introduction to the Government's statutory Code, which confirms that failure to comply with Schedule 4 forfeits the statutory right to recover charges from the keeper under PoFA. That statement reflects the existing legislative framework rather than creating a new requirement.

The appellant therefore requests that POPLA determine compliance with paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e) as a preliminary issue. If either mandatory condition remains unsatisfied, PPS cannot rely upon Schedule 4 to recover the charge from this appellant.

2. No presumption that the keeper was driving

PPS has expressly acknowledged that the appellant appealed as registered keeper and has not identified the driver. Nevertheless, its rejection concentrates upon evidence that the vehicle was stationary without a displayed permit, as though that finding necessarily established the recipient's liability.

It does not. Evidence of an alleged contravention by an unidentified driver is not evidence that the registered keeper was driving, nor does it dispense with the statutory requirements for transferring liability.

PoFA creates no general presumption that the registered keeper was the driver. Nor does a keeper's decision not to identify the driver, without additional evidence, establish that the keeper was driving. The operator must demonstrate either that the appellant was personally liable as driver or that the statutory conditions enabling recovery from the keeper have been satisfied.

The difference between the industry-authored PPSCoP and the Government's forthcoming statutory Code is noteworthy. The former permits an operator to regard failure to identify the driver as potential evidence concerning driver identity, whereas paragraph 8.1.3 of the Government's Code expressly prohibits presuming that the keeper was driving. Neither provision can override PoFA or relieve PPS of the burden of establishing its case.

The appellant respectfully submits that PPS's rejection improperly conflates proof of the alleged permit contravention with proof of keeper liability. POPLA is requested to maintain that distinction throughout its assessment.

3. Landowner authority and the specific treatment of Amazon couriers

This ground is particularly material to the present case because the vehicle was being used for Amazon courier deliveries during the relevant period.

Paragraph 14.1(e) of the PPSCoP applicable on 1 October 2026 expressly requires the operator's written landowner authorisation to address applicable parking terms, including appropriate permissions and exemptions for persons stopping for short periods, specifically identifying delivery drivers and couriers. Paragraph 14.1(f) additionally requires the written authorisation to identify the means by which parking charges will be issued.

These requirements were already in force under the industry Code at the material time. They have been substantially carried forward into the Government's forthcoming statutory Code.

The significance is that PPS cannot establish the full extent of its enforcement authority merely by asserting that a vehicle without a displayed permit was unauthorised. The actual instructions agreed with the landowner are directly relevant to whether temporary courier activity was prohibited, permitted, exempted or subject to particular conditions.

PPS is therefore put to strict proof of its contractual standing and the specific landowner-approved arrangements concerning delivery activity. The appellant requires the production of the contemporaneous, signed landowner agreement, together with any relevant schedules, site-specific instructions or amendments, establishing:

1. The identity and authority of the landowner or managing agent, the precise boundaries of the controlled land and the duration of PPS's appointment, including confirmation that its authority remained operative on 1 October 2026.
2. PPS's authority to offer parking contracts, impose charges and recover them in its own name.
3. The parking restrictions and exemptions applicable to commercial delivery drivers, Amazon couriers, postal workers and other persons temporarily attending the premises to deliver or collect goods.
4. Any permitted delivery locations, loading or unloading arrangements, maximum stopping periods or procedures for obtaining temporary access.
5. The instructions given to enforcement personnel concerning vehicles temporarily stopped for courier deliveries, including how such activity was to be distinguished from ordinary parking.
6. The authorised method of enforcement, including the circumstances in which postal notices could be issued without first serving a Notice to Driver.

Commercially sensitive financial information may be redacted, provided the redactions do not conceal the relevant authority, restrictions, exemptions or enforcement instructions.

The appellant does not contend that all couriers enjoy an automatic exemption. The issue is whether the landowner authorised PPS to impose this charge against a vehicle engaged in the type of short-duration delivery activity contemplated by paragraph 14.1(e), and what actual conditions governed such activity. Those questions cannot properly be determined without adequate evidence of the landowner's instructions.

The Amazon delivery block records are consistent with the vehicle's use for courier work during the relevant evening, although they do not independently prove delivery to Donnington House. This limitation does not excuse PPS from demonstrating the contractual restrictions and exemptions upon which it relies.

4. Identity and status of the operative, self-ticketing and failure to serve a Notice to Driver

The photographs were obtained by a person physically present at the location, apparently over an interval exceeding seven minutes, yet no Notice to Driver was affixed to the vehicle or otherwise served. Instead, PPS subsequently issued a postal NtK.

The appellant acknowledges that PoFA permits a notice to be issued directly to the keeper under paragraph 9 where no Notice to Driver has been given, subject to the applicable statutory conditions. Accordingly, the absence of a windscreen notice is not advanced as an automatic breach of PoFA. Nevertheless, the identity and status of the person recording the alleged contravention are material to determining which provisions of the applicable PPSCoP governed the enforcement process.

PPS is therefore required to establish whether the individual was:

(a) an employee of PPS acting as a parking attendant;

(b) a contractor or agent undertaking enforcement on its behalf; or

(c) a resident, caretaker, managing agent, landowner representative or other third party acting as a self-ticketer.

The appellant requires PPS to disclose the operative's employment or contractual status, relevant identification number, contemporaneous observation notes and the original timestamped photographic record. PPS must also identify the instructions governing the decision to issue a postal notice rather than serve a Notice to Driver at the vehicle.

4.1 If the evidence was obtained by a self-ticketer

Section 15.1 of the applicable PPSCoP imposes specific requirements where evidence is gathered by a third party. These include appropriate registration and acceptance of the Code's requirements, an operator audit of the site, photographic evidence supporting the alleged contravention and quality assurance checks where a postal charge is issued.

If the individual was a self-ticketer, PPS is put to proof of compliance with those requirements, including its records of the third party's authorisation, the site audit and the photographic quality assurance process.

Paragraph 15.2 of the Government's forthcoming statutory Code goes further by expressly requiring evidence explaining why a Notice to Driver could not reasonably have been given or affixed to the vehicle where photographic evidence is supplied by a self-ticketer.

Although that additional requirement was not operative on 1 October 2026, it illustrates the regulatory significance of the distinction between conventional attendant enforcement and self-ticketing.

In this case, where the vehicle was allegedly observed for more than seven minutes, the appellant requests an explanation of why no windscreen notice was served. If PPS relies upon self-ticketing, the assessor should scrutinise the circumstances and require evidence of compliance with the applicable section 15.1 requirements rather than assume that photographs supplied by an unidentified third party were sufficient.

4.2 If the individual was an employed parking attendant

If the operative was employed directly by PPS, the self-ticketing requirements do not apply merely because a postal NtK was subsequently issued. However, PPS should still substantiate the accuracy of the attendant's contemporaneous records and demonstrate that the means of enforcement employed was consistent with its landowner authorisation under paragraph 14.1(f).

The appellant does not invite POPLA to infer misconduct simply from the absence of a windscreen notice. The submission is that PPS has not identified the operative's status or adequately explained the enforcement procedure, notwithstanding that those matters determine the applicability of distinct Code requirements.

5. Temporary courier deliveries, loading and unloading, and Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd

The appellant disputes PPS's apparent assumption that a stationary vehicle without a displayed permit must necessarily have been engaged in ordinary parking.

The circumstances involved the vehicle's use in connection with Amazon courier deliveries. The contemporaneous Amazon block records confirm that the relevant delivery allocation ran from 19:45 until 22:15 on the evening of the alleged contravention. Although detailed address-level delivery records have not been obtainable from Amazon, the evidence supports the stated commercial delivery context.

In Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd [2016] B9GF0A9E, HHJ Harris QC distinguished temporary stopping for loading or unloading from parking in the ordinary contractual sense. The judgment is particularly relevant to residential developments, where lawful access for delivering goods may necessarily involve a vehicle stopping temporarily.

The appellant does not contend that Jopson confers blanket immunity upon Amazon couriers, nor that every period during which a delivery vehicle is unattended necessarily constitutes loading or unloading. The distinction depends upon the actual nature, purpose and duration of the activity, together with the contractual terms governing the premises.

Nevertheless, PPS cannot establish its case simply by demonstrating that the vehicle was unattended and no valid permit was displayed. It must establish that the relevant landowner-approved terms prohibited the particular activity and that the conduct fell within an enforceable restriction.

That is precisely why disclosure of the landowner's arrangements under paragraph 14.1(e) is material rather than incidental.

PPS's asserted observation interval of 20:21:53 to 20:29:22 does not, without further contextual evidence, conclusively determine when a contractual parking period commenced or whether the stationary activity constituted ordinary parking rather than activity incidental to a delivery.

The applicable PPSCoP also provides for consideration periods, although the appellant does not assert an unconditional entitlement to leave a vehicle unattended for five minutes. Any applicable period must be evaluated by reference to the actual circumstances and the driver's conduct.

The Government's forthcoming Code, including paragraph 2.22, reinforces the distinction between recording a vehicle's presence and determining the commencement of a contractual parking period. That paragraph is not relied upon as a direct breach in this attendant-observation case. The central question remains whether PPS has established the nature of the alleged parking activity and its contractual basis.

6. Failure to establish an enforceable contract and adequate signage

PPS describes the site as "PRIVATE LAND, PERMIT HOLDERS ONLY" and states that vehicles without a valid permit are unauthorised. The appellant disputes that this description alone establishes an enforceable contractual charge.

PPS must identify the contractual offer allegedly made to a motorist lacking a valid permit, the terms upon which that offer could be accepted and the conduct said to constitute acceptance. A prohibition upon unauthorised parking is not necessarily equivalent to an offer permitting otherwise prohibited parking in exchange for £100.

Although restrictive signage is not invariably incapable of creating enforceable obligations, its actual contractual effect must be established. The decision in ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 does not dispense with the fundamental requirements of contractual formation, adequate notice and lawful authority.

There is also a separate evidential concern. The alleged contravention occurred after 20:20 on an October evening, during darkness. PPS is therefore required to demonstrate that its entrance signs and contractual terms were adequately visible and legible in the prevailing conditions, particularly the permit restriction, the £100 charge and any applicable provisions concerning temporary stopping.

The appellant requires contemporaneous or otherwise reliable evidence of the entrance signage, a plan identifying the relevant signs and the vehicle's location, and photographs accurately representing nighttime visibility. Reliance upon daylight images or isolated close-ups of signs does not, without more, establish that the material terms were adequately communicated to an arriving motorist.

The principles concerning adequate contractual notice are reflected in Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106, the applicable signage provisions of the PPSCoP and section 3 of the forthcoming Government Code.

The appellant further submits that, in a residential development where courier activity may be anticipated, the adequacy of signage must be considered alongside the landowner-approved restrictions and exemptions. PPS must demonstrate not merely that a permit requirement was displayed, but that the actual terms relied upon gave rise to the contractual charge alleged in these circumstances.

Conclusion

The primary issue in this appeal is whether PPS has established the statutory entitlement to recover the parking charge from the registered keeper. The operator has not demonstrated compliance with the distinct mandatory requirements of paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e) of Schedule 4 to PoFA. Its subsequent production of observation records and assertion that the vehicle was without a permit cannot retrospectively remedy a defective NtK or establish the keeper's personal liability.

The appellant emphasises that Schedule 4 must be applied according to the conditions enacted by Parliament. An assessor's view that an identified statutory omission is merely technical or insignificant cannot substitute for determining whether the mandatory requirement has actually been satisfied.

In the alternative, PPS has failed to substantiate the full extent of its landowner authority, including the specific treatment of delivery drivers and couriers expressly contemplated by paragraph 14.1(e) of the applicable PPSCoP. This is directly relevant because the alleged contravention arose while the vehicle was being used for Amazon courier work.

PPS has additionally failed to identify satisfactorily the person who recorded the contravention, establish whether self-ticketing requirements applied, or explain why a postal notice was issued without service of a Notice to Driver. The appellant also disputes the contractual basis of the charge, the adequacy of the nighttime signage and the assumption that temporary courier-related stopping necessarily constituted ordinary parking.

The appellant respectfully requests that POPLA determine the PoFA keeper-liability issues first. If PPS has failed to satisfy either applicable mandatory requirement, its statutory entitlement to recover the charge from the keeper does not arise, irrespective of whether an unidentified driver might otherwise have incurred an enforceable obligation.

Should the assessor consider the remaining grounds necessary, PPS is required to establish the relevant contractual and evidential matters on the balance of probabilities, including its standing, the landowner's actual courier arrangements and the lawful basis of the alleged charge.

For these reasons, the appellant requests that the appeal be allowed and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain
#12
I unfortunately cannot get more evidence to prove the delivery was to donnington house, but i have just read the draft and i think it is fine, shall i send the appeal through?
#13
@zyno, yes, I would go ahead and submit the POPLA appeal.

It is unfortunate that Amazon cannot provide the delivery records confirming Donnington House as the destination, but that does not prevent you from proceeding. The Amazon block screenshot is still useful supporting evidence that the vehicle was being used for courier work during the relevant period, although it does not establish that a delivery was being made at that particular address.

More importantly, the principal grounds of appeal concern PPS's failure to comply with PoFA and its ability to hold you liable as the registered keeper. Those arguments do not depend upon proving the Amazon delivery.

The appeal also puts PPS to strict proof of its landowner authority, including the specific arrangements for deliveries and couriers, as required by the existing PPSCoP. It is for PPS to substantiate the contractual terms and enforcement authority upon which it relies.

Submit the appeal as drafted, together with the supporting evidence, including both sides of the NtK, the rejection letter, relevant photographs and the Amazon block screenshot. Make sure you select Registered Keeper and do not identify the driver.

Once submitted, keep a copy of everything and the POPLA acknowledgement.

Importantly, PPS will be required to submit its evidence pack in response to your appeal. You should then have seven days to review and comment on that evidence. Do not miss that opportunity, particularly as we want to examine whatever PPS produces concerning its landowner agreement, courier arrangements and the identity of the person who issued the PCN.

When that evidence pack becomes available, post it here before submitting any comments. We can then identify any omissions, inconsistencies or failures to address the specific grounds raised.

There is no guarantee POPLA will uphold the appeal, but I consider the statutory keeper-liability arguments sufficiently substantial to justify proceeding.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain
#14
I have submitted the appeal to POPLA, with all the evidence. I’ll get back to you once they respond. 
Thank You once again @b789 .
#15
PPS has provided some evidence.
“Dear POPLA Assessor, We write on behalf of Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd in response to the appeal concerning Parking Charge (pc number) , issued to vehicle (reg) at Donnington House, 2A Sutton Court Road, Sutton, SM1 4SY, following the parking event on 1 October 2026 at approximately 20:29. The Parking Charge was issued for “Not Clearly Displaying a Valid Permit”, in accordance with the terms and conditions displayed at the site. The operator maintains that the photographic evidence, signage, site map and landowner agreement establish that the vehicle was parked on controlled private land without a clearly displayed valid permit. The signage identifies the site as private land restricted to permit holders and requires a valid parking permit to be clearly displayed on the front windscreen. It also instructs drivers to park within marked bays and prohibits parking on yellow lines, footpaths or in a manner causing obstruction. The £100 Parking Charge, reduced to £60 if paid within 14 days, is clearly displayed. The terms also state, “DO NOT PARK HERE UNLESS YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS & CONDITIONS DISPLAYED.” The entrance photograph shows a prominently positioned “PRIVATE LAND – PERMIT HOLDERS ONLY” sign, with further signs installed along the boundary wall. The site map identifies the managed area and relevant sign positions. These materials demonstrate how the parking restrictions are communicated to motorists. The contemporaneous photographs show vehicle (reg) parked beside the wall within the controlled area. The first photograph is timestamped 20:22:02 and the last 20:28:52, an interval of 6 minutes and 50 seconds. The vehicle remains in the same position in the first and final images. Photographs of the windscreen show a circular item described as a resident permit, but do not establish that a valid PPS permit for this location was clearly displayed. The supplied example PPS permit identifies the site and includes validity fields. The displayed circular item is not evidence that the vehicle complied with the requirement to display a valid permit accepted at Donnington House. The operator therefore maintains that the recorded reason for issue is supported by the photographic evidence. The appellant states that the vehicle was being used for Amazon deliveries and has supplied an Amazon delivery block confirmation covering 19:45 to 22:15 on 1 October 2026. The operator acknowledges that this document supports the appellant's account of being scheduled for courier work. However, it does not identify Donnington House as a delivery destination, confirm a delivery at the location during the observation period or establish permission to park without a valid permit. A courier booking alone does not demonstrate an exemption from the conditions applicable to this private land. The appellant refers to Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd and argues that temporary loading or unloading should be distinguished from parking. The operator acknowledges that the circumstances of an actual delivery may be relevant to that distinction. Nevertheless, the appellant's block confirmation does not establish what activity was taking place at Donnington House during the observed period. The evidence available to the operator shows a vehicle remaining in the same position for 6 minutes and 50 seconds without a clearly displayed valid site permit. No site-specific delivery record or permission has been provided. The operator therefore maintains that the appellant has not established that the observed parking was authorised or exempt from the displayed terms. The landowner agreement supplied for Donnington House authorises Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd to manage parking and pursue charges for breaches of the advertised restrictions. It expressly requires a valid PPS permit to be displayed facing upwards on the windscreen and does not provide a general exemption for Amazon couriers or commercial delivery drivers. The agreement was signed in December 2023 and provides for continuation subject to its termination provisions. The operator relies upon the agreement and site map to establish its authority over the relevant area on the date of the parking event. The appellant's request for further evidence of a courier exemption does not establish that any such exemption existed. The appellant questions whether permit-holder signage can create a contract with an unauthorised motorist. The operator submits that the sign must be read as a whole. It identifies the conditions of parking, the permit requirement and the £100 charge arising from non-compliance. It also explains that parking on the private land carries contractual liability for unauthorised parking and instructs drivers not to park unless they agree with the displayed terms. The operator maintains that the signage communicates the contractual conditions and the consequences of leaving a vehicle parked without meeting them. The displayed contact details also provide a means to enquire about authorisation before parking. The appellant raises the visibility of the signs at night. The contemporaneous photograph taken at 20:28:52 shows a terms-and-conditions sign installed on the wall near the vehicle, and a separate close photograph taken at 20:28:52 records its wording. The additional entrance photograph demonstrates the prominent positioning of the permit-holders-only sign and further signs along the wall, although that photograph was taken in daylight. The operator relies on the combined evidence of the signs' positions, the site map and the contemporaneous nighttime images; it does not claim that the daylight entrance photograph was taken during the parking event. The appellant disputes the consideration period. The purpose of that period is to give a motorist sufficient opportunity to find, read and understand the terms and decide whether to remain. The photographs establish that the vehicle remained parked in the same position for 6 minutes and 50 seconds, and do not show the driver examining the signage during the photographed moments. The operator submits that this evidence is consistent with an established parking event rather than a driver simply reading the terms. It is not claimed that the photographs establish the driver's whereabouts throughout the entire interval. The operator maintains that motorists must ensure that the displayed permit requirements are met when choosing to leave their vehicles parked. The appellant appeals as the registered keeper and has not identified the driver. The operator acknowledges that there is no presumption that the keeper was driving and no general obligation to name the driver. The postal notice invited the keeper to provide the driver's name and current address for service. Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 permits recovery of an unpaid parking charge from a keeper where the driver is not identified only if the applicable statutory conditions have been satisfied. The operator relies upon the notice issued on 5 October 2026, within 14 days of the event, and the accompanying evidence. The notice identifies the vehicle, location, incident date, charge and alleged breach, and contains a warning concerning potential keeper liability. The appellant specifically challenges paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4, arguing that the notice describes the period of parking only as the period immediately preceding the incident time of 20:29. The operator submits the timestamped photographs and observation records to establish the period actually observed and the circumstances of the alleged breach. The photographic record runs from 20:22:02 to 20:28:52. The operator recognises that these records do not alter the wording of the original notice and that any transfer of liability to the keeper remains dependent upon compliance with the statutory requirement to specify the period of parking. The appellant also raises paragraph 9(2)(e); the notice invites the keeper, if not the driver, to provide the driver's name and current address for service and pass the notice to that person. The operator relies upon the notice as issued for consideration of its statutory wording. The appellant also refers to a later Government parking code. The operator notes that any requirements introduced after 1 October 2026 cannot be applied retrospectively to this event. The parking conditions and relevant legal and industry requirements applicable on the incident date remain the basis of the operator's position. The internal appeal was considered and rejected by correspondence dated 21 October 2026, which identified the permit requirement and the reason for issuing the Parking Charge. The appellant's submitted evidence, including the Amazon delivery block confirmation and copies of the notice and correspondence, does not demonstrate that a valid site permit was displayed or that the landholder had authorised this vehicle to park without one. In conclusion, Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd maintains that the Parking Charge was issued for a breach of the clearly displayed permit requirement. The vehicle was photographed parked within the controlled area without a clearly displayed valid PPS permit, the signage identifies the applicable conditions and charge, and the landowner agreement supports the operator's authority. The Amazon block confirmation does not establish a site-specific delivery or exemption. The operator respectfully requests that the appeal be refused and the Parking Charge upheld, subject to the applicable statutory requirements governing any recovery from the registered keeper.”

https://prodapi.popla.co.uk/appeal/GetDo...ntract.pdf

This is the evidence they have provided alongside some additional photos of the vehicle which I have already shown. 
What comments shall i make?


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#16
@zyno, it would help me enormously if you at least tried to split that block of text from the feckwits at POPLA into readable paragraphs. However, this time I have done that for you and reproduce it here and I will get back to you after I have had a chance to actually read it:

Quote:Dear POPLA Assessor,

We write on behalf of Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd in response to the appeal concerning Parking Charge (pc number), issued to vehicle (reg) at Donnington House, 2A Sutton Court Road, Sutton, SM1 4SY, following the parking event on 1 October 2026 at approximately 20:29.

The Parking Charge was issued for "Not Clearly Displaying a Valid Permit", in accordance with the terms and conditions displayed at the site. The operator maintains that the photographic evidence, signage, site map and landowner agreement establish that the vehicle was parked on controlled private land without a clearly displayed valid permit.

The signage identifies the site as private land restricted to permit holders and requires a valid parking permit to be clearly displayed on the front windscreen. It also instructs drivers to park within marked bays and prohibits parking on yellow lines, footpaths or in a manner causing obstruction. The £100 Parking Charge, reduced to £60 if paid within 14 days, is clearly displayed. The terms also state, "DO NOT PARK HERE UNLESS YOU AGREE TO THE TERMS & CONDITIONS DISPLAYED."

The entrance photograph shows a prominently positioned "PRIVATE LAND – PERMIT HOLDERS ONLY" sign, with further signs installed along the boundary wall. The site map identifies the managed area and relevant sign positions. These materials demonstrate how the parking restrictions are communicated to motorists.

The contemporaneous photographs show vehicle (reg) parked beside the wall within the controlled area. The first photograph is timestamped 20:22:02 and the last 20:28:52, an interval of 6 minutes and 50 seconds. The vehicle remains in the same position in the first and final images.

Photographs of the windscreen show a circular item described as a resident permit, but do not establish that a valid PPS permit for this location was clearly displayed. The supplied example PPS permit identifies the site and includes validity fields. The displayed circular item is not evidence that the vehicle complied with the requirement to display a valid permit accepted at Donnington House. The operator therefore maintains that the recorded reason for issue is supported by the photographic evidence.

The appellant states that the vehicle was being used for Amazon deliveries and has supplied an Amazon delivery block confirmation covering 19:45 to 22:15 on 1 October 2026. The operator acknowledges that this document supports the appellant's account of being scheduled for courier work. However, it does not identify Donnington House as a delivery destination, confirm a delivery at the location during the observation period or establish permission to park without a valid permit. A courier booking alone does not demonstrate an exemption from the conditions applicable to this private land.

The appellant refers to Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd and argues that temporary loading or unloading should be distinguished from parking. The operator acknowledges that the circumstances of an actual delivery may be relevant to that distinction. Nevertheless, the appellant's block confirmation does not establish what activity was taking place at Donnington House during the observed period.

The evidence available to the operator shows a vehicle remaining in the same position for 6 minutes and 50 seconds without a clearly displayed valid site permit. No site-specific delivery record or permission has been provided. The operator therefore maintains that the appellant has not established that the observed parking was authorised or exempt from the displayed terms.

The landowner agreement supplied for Donnington House authorises Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd to manage parking and pursue charges for breaches of the advertised restrictions. It expressly requires a valid PPS permit to be displayed facing upwards on the windscreen and does not provide a general exemption for Amazon couriers or commercial delivery drivers.

The agreement was signed in December 2023 and provides for continuation subject to its termination provisions. The operator relies upon the agreement and site map to establish its authority over the relevant area on the date of the parking event. The appellant's request for further evidence of a courier exemption does not establish that any such exemption existed.

The appellant questions whether permit-holder signage can create a contract with an unauthorised motorist. The operator submits that the sign must be read as a whole. It identifies the conditions of parking, the permit requirement and the £100 charge arising from non-compliance. It also explains that parking on the private land carries contractual liability for unauthorised parking and instructs drivers not to park unless they agree with the displayed terms.

The operator maintains that the signage communicates the contractual conditions and the consequences of leaving a vehicle parked without meeting them. The displayed contact details also provide a means to enquire about authorisation before parking.

The appellant raises the visibility of the signs at night. The contemporaneous photograph taken at 20:28:52 shows a terms-and-conditions sign installed on the wall near the vehicle, and a separate close photograph taken at 20:28:52 records its wording.

The additional entrance photograph demonstrates the prominent positioning of the permit-holders-only sign and further signs along the wall, although that photograph was taken in daylight. The operator relies on the combined evidence of the signs' positions, the site map and the contemporaneous nighttime images; it does not claim that the daylight entrance photograph was taken during the parking event.

The appellant disputes the consideration period. The purpose of that period is to give a motorist sufficient opportunity to find, read and understand the terms and decide whether to remain. The photographs establish that the vehicle remained parked in the same position for 6 minutes and 50 seconds, and do not show the driver examining the signage during the photographed moments.

The operator submits that this evidence is consistent with an established parking event rather than a driver simply reading the terms. It is not claimed that the photographs establish the driver's whereabouts throughout the entire interval. The operator maintains that motorists must ensure that the displayed permit requirements are met when choosing to leave their vehicles parked.

The appellant appeals as the registered keeper and has not identified the driver. The operator acknowledges that there is no presumption that the keeper was driving and no general obligation to name the driver. The postal notice invited the keeper to provide the driver's name and current address for service.

Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 permits recovery of an unpaid parking charge from a keeper where the driver is not identified only if the applicable statutory conditions have been satisfied. The operator relies upon the notice issued on 5 October 2026, within 14 days of the event, and the accompanying evidence. The notice identifies the vehicle, location, incident date, charge and alleged breach, and contains a warning concerning potential keeper liability.

The appellant specifically challenges paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4, arguing that the notice describes the period of parking only as the period immediately preceding the incident time of 20:29. The operator submits the timestamped photographs and observation records to establish the period actually observed and the circumstances of the alleged breach. The photographic record runs from 20:22:02 to 20:28:52.

The operator recognises that these records do not alter the wording of the original notice and that any transfer of liability to the keeper remains dependent upon compliance with the statutory requirement to specify the period of parking.

The appellant also raises paragraph 9(2)(e); the notice invites the keeper, if not the driver, to provide the driver's name and current address for service and pass the notice to that person. The operator relies upon the notice as issued for consideration of its statutory wording.

The appellant also refers to a later Government parking code. The operator notes that any requirements introduced after 1 October 2026 cannot be applied retrospectively to this event. The parking conditions and relevant legal and industry requirements applicable on the incident date remain the basis of the operator's position.

The internal appeal was considered and rejected by correspondence dated 21 October 2026, which identified the permit requirement and the reason for issuing the Parking Charge. The appellant's submitted evidence, including the Amazon delivery block confirmation and copies of the notice and correspondence, does not demonstrate that a valid site permit was displayed or that the landholder had authorised this vehicle to park without one.

In conclusion, Private Parking Solutions (London) Ltd maintains that the Parking Charge was issued for a breach of the clearly displayed permit requirement. The vehicle was photographed parked within the controlled area without a clearly displayed valid PPS permit, the signage identifies the applicable conditions and charge, and the landowner agreement supports the operator's authority.

The Amazon block confirmation does not establish a site-specific delivery or exemption. The operator respectfully requests that the appeal be refused and the Parking Charge upheld, subject to the applicable statutory requirements governing any recovery from the registered keeper.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain
#17
The PPS evidence pack has now been reviewed, including the four-page landowner agreement. There are several significant deficiencies and omissions which warrant challenging before POPLA reaches its decision.

I suggest submitting the following rebuttal in response to the operator's evidence. It concentrates on the outstanding PoFA keeper-liability defects, the inadequacies of the landowner agreement, the absence of any specific arrangements for Amazon couriers and the unexplained circumstances surrounding the issuing of a postal NtK rather than a windscreen notice.

The PoFA arguments remain the most important. In particular, PPS cannot retrospectively correct a defective NtK by producing additional observation records, and its demand for payment must be scrutinised against the specific requirements of paragraph 9(2)(e).

Submit the rebuttal within POPLA's seven-day evidence-comment period. Do not identify the driver or add further details about the driver's activities.

Quote:APPELLANT'S COMMENTS ON THE OPERATOR'S EVIDENCE

The appellant maintains all grounds of the original appeal. These comments address specific deficiencies and admissions arising from PPS's evidence pack, particularly concerning statutory keeper liability, landowner authority and the arrangements governing temporary courier deliveries.

1. Failure to establish statutory keeper liability

PPS expressly acknowledges that its subsequent observation records do not alter the wording of the original Notice to Keeper. That admission is material.

Paragraph 9(2)(a) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires the NtK itself to specify the period of parking. The original notice identifies no defined commencement time or duration, stating merely that the period was an unspecified interval immediately preceding the incident time of 20:29.

PPS now relies upon photographs taken between 20:22:02 and 20:28:52 and operative records allegedly extending from 20:21:53 to 20:29:22. Neither interval was specified in the NtK.

The existence of contemporaneous records is not the statutory question. The question is whether the notice served upon the keeper satisfied paragraph 9(2)(a). PPS has not demonstrated that it did.

The operator has similarly failed to address the opening requirement of paragraph 9(2)(e), namely the obligation to state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service.

Failure to comply with PoFA Schedule 4, paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) — absence of the statutory invitation to pay

The appellant specifically challenges PPS's compliance with paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The provision expressly requires the creditor to invite the keeper "to pay the unpaid parking charges", as part of the statutory arrangements governing recovery from a registered keeper whose liability has not otherwise been established.

The NtK does not contain an invitation expressed in those terms. Instead, PPS states:

"We, the Creditor, now require this amount to be paid using one of the payment methods described overleaf."

The distinction between requiring and inviting payment is material. A requirement asserts an existing obligation to pay, whereas an invitation affords the recipient an opportunity to make payment without necessarily asserting that a personal legal liability has already arisen.

At the time the NtK was issued, PPS had not established that the registered keeper was the driver, nor had it demonstrated satisfaction of the statutory conditions necessary to transfer the driver's alleged liability to the keeper. An unqualified demand directed at the keeper therefore risks misrepresenting the recipient's legal position.

In its response to POPLA, PPS again relies upon the NtK's invitation to identify the driver, without addressing the separate objection concerning the language employed in demanding payment. The operator's reliance upon paragraph 9(2)(e)(ii) does not, of itself, establish that its payment demand satisfies the statutory language of paragraph 9(2)(e)(i).

The appellant acknowledges that the legislation employs the conjunction "or" between the alternative courses of action specified in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), and that the precise statutory wording need not necessarily be reproduced verbatim. The issue, however, is whether the NtK, construed as a whole, adequately conveys the statutory invitation rather than incorrectly asserting an unconditional obligation upon the keeper.

Furthermore, paragraph 9(2)(e) expressly requires the creditor to state that it does not know both the driver's name and a current address for service. PPS has not identified where that separate mandatory statement appears in the original notice. Its conditional warning about future keeper liability under paragraph 9(2)(f) does not necessarily satisfy that requirement.

The appellant therefore maintains that PPS has failed to demonstrate compliance with paragraph 9(2)(e) as a whole, including the particular statutory language of subparagraph (i).

These are not discretionary requirements which an assessor may simply dispense with because the operator has demonstrated an underlying permit contravention. Parliament made compliance with the applicable provisions of Schedule 4 a condition of the statutory entitlement to recover charges from the keeper.

The appellant requests that POPLA expressly determine whether PPS's unconditional demand for payment, considered alongside the absence of the required statement concerning the creditor's knowledge of the driver, satisfies paragraph 9(2)(e). The operator's general assertion of compliance is insufficient to resolve that question.

2. Incomplete evidence of landowner authority

The agreement submitted by PPS identifies Sutton Borough Conservative Federation as the contracting party. However, it does not establish whether that organisation was the proprietor, leaseholder or duly authorised managing agent entitled to appoint PPS.

Page 2 expressly requests supporting documentary evidence of the contracting party's authority over the premises. No such documentation appears in the four-page agreement.

Furthermore, page 1 expressly requires a site map defining the enforcement boundaries to be attached at page 4. The fourth page instead contains a list of regular car users and their registration numbers. It does not constitute the boundary map expressly requested by the agreement.

The appellant acknowledges that the document grants PPS general enforcement powers. However, the question remains whether PPS has adequately substantiated the contracting party's underlying authority and the precise geographical extent of the authorisation relied upon.

Any separately supplied site map must be examined to determine whether it identifies the contractual boundaries and corresponds with the landowner's authorisation.

3. Landowner arrangements concerning couriers and deliveries

The appellant's original appeal expressly challenged PPS's authority to enforce against a vehicle engaged in Amazon courier activity and required disclosure of the landowner's instructions concerning temporary deliveries.

PPS now asserts that its agreement provides no general exemption for commercial delivery drivers.

However, page 3 of the agreement contains a specific section requesting additional site-management instructions, including restrictions, permissions and relevant conditions. Those fields have been left blank.

Paragraph 14.1(e) of the applicable PPSCoP expressly requires written landowner authorisation covering relevant parking terms, including appropriate permissions and exemptions for persons stopping briefly, with delivery drivers and couriers specifically identified as examples.

The agreement contains no provision expressly addressing the treatment of genuine temporary deliveries, loading or unloading. Nor does PPS produce any site-specific operational instructions establishing how its attendants should distinguish ordinary parking from temporary courier activity.

It is not suggested that the Code automatically exempts all delivery drivers. Rather, the appellant submits that the contractual evidence does not satisfactorily establish how the landowner intended such activity to be regulated.

The contemporaneous Amazon block confirmation establishes that the vehicle was being used in connection with scheduled courier work during the relevant period. Although the document does not independently establish a delivery to Donnington House, it is relevant contextual evidence and must not be represented as having no evidential significance.

The appellant maintains the distinction identified in *Jopson v Homeguard Services Ltd* between ordinary parking and temporary stopping for loading or unloading. PPS has not produced evidence resolving the landowner's intended treatment of that distinction at this location.

4. Identity of the operative and method of enforcement

The agreement states that PPS operatives may patrol the premises. However, the operator's evidence does not establish whether the individual who photographed the vehicle was directly employed by PPS or acted as a third-party self-ticketer.

That distinction matters because section 15.1 of the applicable PPSCoP imposes additional requirements where evidence is gathered by third parties, including registration, site auditing and quality assurance checks.

No Notice to Driver was served despite the operative allegedly observing the vehicle for more than seven minutes. The appellant accepts that a postal NtK may lawfully be issued without a preceding windscreen notice. Nevertheless, the circumstances do not establish the operative's status or demonstrate whether the applicable self-ticketing requirements were satisfied.

5. Conclusion

The operator's evidence has not remedied the original statutory challenges concerning paragraphs 9(2)(a) and 9(2)(e) of PoFA. Indeed, PPS expressly acknowledges that its supplementary observation records do not amend the original NtK.

The landowner agreement also contains material evidential gaps concerning the contracting party's authority, the required boundary documentation and the treatment of temporary deliveries and couriers.

The appellant requests that POPLA determine the statutory keeper-liability conditions first. If the NtK fails to satisfy either mandatory requirement, PPS cannot recover the charge from the registered keeper under Schedule 4, irrespective of whether it has established an underlying contravention by an unidentified driver.

The appellant respectfully requests that the appeal be allowed.

I can't remember whether the POPLA website allows you to upload your response as an attachment (pdf). If not, just copy and paste the above text as is into their webform as it is within the character limit.
Never argue with stupid people. They will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience. - Mark Twain


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